Basecoin: A Price-Stable Cryptocurrency with an Algorithmic Central Bank
Introduction: Why Does Price Stability Matter?
Today, very few people use cryptocurrencies for normal, day-to-day transactions. But why?
Some would say it’s because cryptocurrencies are slow and expensive to use. While that’s true of Bitcoin and many older cryptocurrencies, it’s certainly not true of some newer protocols. For example, Dash claims it can confirm transactions in under a second and handle thousands of transactions per second at fees of less than $0.15 per transaction, with fees expected to decrease further over time. Others would say it’s because cryptocurrencies aren’t reliable or trusted. But that’s also not true, as there are many protocols with firm backing from respected investors and strong development teams. Furthermore, Bitcoin itself has shown that the blockchain model is extremely robust from a fault-tolerance perspective.
Some would say cryptocurrencies aren’t widely used because there is an inherent chicken and egg problem: Because everyone uses local currency, merchants don’t have an incentive to accept anything else. But we actually think the opposite is true. As long as some customers want to pay in cryptocurrency, it costs merchants almost no overhead to accept it, and it costs them sales if they don’t. In fact, because cryptocurrencies are immune to fraudulent chargebacks, and transaction fees can be much lower than fees for credit and even debit cards, merchants should actually prefer cryptocurrency payments.
We can find two clues to the real problem by examining the perspectives of the merchant and the customer in turn. First, consider the merchants that do accept cryptocurrency payments today. Microsoft, Quickbooks, and Spotify, for example, allow customers to pay in Bitcoin using a service calledBitPay. However, none of these merchants keep their money in Bitcoin—instead, they immediately convert any Bitcoin they receive into USD. Why? Well, these merchants are not in the business of speculating on Bitcoin. They don’t want exposure to Bitcoin market risk any more than they want to hold their money in barrels of oil. What if Bitcoin dropped 90% one day? If you ask people who love cryptocurrencies, they might mention many of the attributes they love—for example, the convenience, the control, and the semi-anonymity. But we bet they still can’t stomach the idea of keeping their life savings or quarterly revenue invested in such a volatile asset. In other words, in order for cryptocurrencies to become more than just a playground for speculation, there is a severe need for them to be a stable store of value.
从商户和消费者角度分析，我们可以找到两点问题线索:首先,考虑到目前接受数字 货币支付的商家。比如Microsoft、Quickbooks和Spotify，允许消费者通过BitPay2服务以比特币支付。可上述这几家商户没有一家会将款项以比特币的方式来保存-相比之 下，他们会立刻将收到的比特币换成美金。为什么?因为这些商户对比特币的投机不感兴趣。他们宁愿把钱存在石油桶中也不愿暴露在比特币行业的风险之下。如果有天比特币下跌90%怎么办?如果问的是加密货币爱好者，那他们会提到很多各自喜爱的特性，比如便捷、易控制和半匿名等。但我们敢打赌，他们不会将毕生积蓄或一个季 度的收入都投资到这种价格如此不稳定的资产中去。也就是说，为了使加密货币不仅作为投机者的游乐场，它们对“成为一个稳定价值存储”还有着迫切需要。
Second, imagine trying to make a purchase using Bitcoin. Because merchants want to collect a fixed amount of USD for their services, you’re faced with a constantly adjusting BTC price for your potential purchase. This is a terrible user experience. Even worse, imagine receiving a job offer that pays 1 BTC per month. If the price of BTC happened to drop one month, you can’t pay your bills. Alternatively, if you borrowed money via a loan that demands a monthly payment of 1 BTC, a price swing in the other direction could leave you in default. We’ll discuss this more later, but the fundamental problem is that today’s price-volatile cryptocurrencies subject any contract promising or taking future payments to extreme price risk. From this, we can see that in order for cryptocurrencies to become a viable medium of exchange or unit of account, there is again a severe need for price stability.
Any currency has three fundamental functions: A store of value, a medium of exchange, and a unit of account. We believe that price stability is a gatekeeper to the mainstream adoption of a currency for any of these purposes. In this whitepaper, we introduce Basecoin, the first cryptocurrency to implement robust, decentralized, and protocol- enforced price stability. Specifically, we discuss the following topics:
- Use Cases for a Price-Stable Cryptocurrency: A number of valuable use cases in which a price-stable cryptocurrency would be preferred over the best alternative
- How Basecoin Implements Price Stability: A specification of a fully-decentralized, price-stable cryptocurrency protocol, and why it is robust.
- A Post-USD World: How a world economy denominated in Basecoin
- Other Attempts at a Stable Coin: Why other attempts at developing a stable coin are insufficiently
- 稳定币的应用案例:大量证明“价格稳定的数字货币将是您最好选择”的有价 值的应用案例
Use Cases for a Price-Stable Cryptocurrency
People living in developed economies take for granted their access to stable currencies. If you’re in the US with unfettered access to dollars, or in the EU with access to euros, you may wonder why the world needs a price-stable cryptocurrency. However, in nations with weak institutions and unstable currencies, hyperinflation is extremely common. In these markets, we expect a price-stable cryptocurrency will be in very high demand.
As of publication in Q3 2017, Egypt is suffering 32% annual inflation, Argentina 23%, and Nigeria 16%. And this is just a sampling of countries whose governments are relatively more stable—let’s not forget Venezuela, whose annual inflation rate is currently at 741%. What would you do if your savings were disappearing at a rate of 741% a year? Faced with a rapidly devaluing local currency, people look for other ways to survive, frequently flocking to the USD. This effect is known as dollarization. Generally, it takes three forms:
- First, a population might choose to adopt the dollar over local currency without any coordination from the local The USD is used as the de facto currency ina number of Central Asian and sub-Saharan African countries, and the rate of adoption can be overwhelmingly fast despite the lack of official coordination. For example, in the 2 years from 2006 to 2008, dollarization inthe Seychellesjumped from 20% to 60%.
- Second, a country’s citizens might demand the dollar in spite of government capital controls that prevent the transfer of USD across its borders. Argentina’s black market for dollars, the dolar blue, was an open secret during its reign of capital controls from 2011 to 2015. During these years,$10 million to $40 million per daychanged hands under the table at rates that were 25-30% above the official exchange rate. These rates were evenpublished daily in national newspapers, despite it being officially
- Third, currency devaluation could grow so extreme that governments might officially switch to the USD,as happened in Zimbabwe in 2009. Today, the entire country requires routine shipments of physical paper dollars and coins
- 第一，很大一部分人会在没有当地政府协调的情况下采取美元支付，而非当 地货币。实际上，在一些位于中亚地区和撒哈拉以南地区的国家4，尽快没有 官方协调，美元也正以惊人的速度发展为实际货币。例如，在2006年至2008 年的两年里，塞舌尔地区的美元化比率从20%飞速增长至60%。
- 第二，尽管政府资本管控能够有效限制美元“过境”，国家的公民们可能还是 会对美元有所需求。2011至2015年阿根廷的资本管控期间，美元黑市-blue dollar(阿根廷人对黑市美元的称呼)就曾是个公开的秘密。当时，黑市美元 的日交易额均处在100亿美元至400亿美元6之间，而汇率更是比官方报价高出了25%~30%。这些黑市汇率甚至公开发布在当地全国性的大报纸上，尽管这样做在官方看来是不合法的。
- 第三，货币贬值的极度发展将可能导致政府由官方决定转用美元，就像2009 年的津巴布韦8那样。如今，其整个国家都在发出需求-保证美元纸币和硬币的日常运输。
Isn’t there an opportunity here? Whether or not dollarization is officially endorsed, citizens, banks, and governments incur significant costs in importing physical USD. A cryptocurrency solution, by which millions of dollars could be transported on one’s phone, seems like a vastly superior alternative to paper dollars in all dollarization scenarios.
As a final aside: It is true that many people in these hyperinflating economies are now using more Bitcoin. However, Bitcoin can never truly free people from their unstable local currencies due to its own lack of price stability. For example, if Bitcoin is going through a cycle of devaluation, from a usage perspective, there is no distinguishable difference between it and a devaluing local currency. People will clearly want to move to a price-stable alternative once this happens a few times—should one exist. A stable coin would thus be the killer app for developing economies experiencing rapid currency devaluation. In the extreme case, instead of switching to importing paper dollars and coins, the next country to switch away from its local currency like Zimbabwe did could instead adopt a price-stable cryptocurrency.
Along these lines,in a 2017 speech, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine LaGarde, proposed:
[T]hink of countries with weak institutions and unstable national curren- cies. Instead of adopting the currency of another country—such as theU.S. dollar—some of these economies might see a growing use of virtual currencies. Call it dollarization 2.0.
对于那些机构薄弱、货币价格不稳定的国家，与其接受采用另一个国家的货币- 比如美元-不如意识到数字加密货币的使用率也在增长。对此，我们称之为美元化2.0(dollarization 2.0)。
IMF experience shows that there is a tipping point beyond which coordina- tion around a new currency is exponential. In the Seychelles, for example, dollarization jumped from 20 percent in 2006 to 60 percent in 2008.
And yet, why might citizens hold virtual currencies rather than physical dollars, euros, or sterling? Because it may one day be easier and safer thanobtaining paper bills, especially in remote regions. And because virtual currencies could actually become more stable.
For instance, they could be issued one-for-one for dollars, or a stable basket of currencies. Issuance could be fully transparent, governed by a credible, pre-defined rule, an algorithm that can be monitored. . . or even a “smart rule” that might reflect changing macroeconomic circumstances. So in many ways, virtual currencies might just give existing currencies and monetary policy a run for their money.
A Low-Volatility Cryptoasset for Traders
Today, many traders on cryptocurrency exchanges convert their cryptocurrency into USD when there’s turbulence in the crypto markets. But this is problematic for a few reasons.
First, many exchanges are crypto-only, meaning they don’t allow conversions into fiat. On such exchanges, traders are in desperate need of a price-stable cryptocurrency that they can use to wait out dips in the broader crypto market. To fill this need, a centralized solution known asUSD Tetherhas arisen—but,for reasons discussed later, a centralized solution like Tether will likely never work long term, and sentiment toward Tether is extremely negative as a result. To that end, Tether’s $400 million market cap proves the need, but it is also completely incapable of serving it long term.
首先，很多交易所都只针对数字货币(币币交易所)，这意味着，在这些交易所中不允许兑现法币。对于这类交易所，交易者们就迫切需要一种价格稳定的数字货币-等待下跌，以备抄底。为了满足这个需求，一个中心化的解决方案—USD Tether诞生 了，但是像Tether这样的中心化解决方案很难长期维系(原因稍后讨论)，所以也导致了市场对Tether极为消极的态度。但Tether4亿美金的市值已经证明了市场需求，只可惜，它是完全不可能长期运转下去的。
Additionally, even though some traders have access to exchanges that allow them to convert to fiat during times of turbulence, many prefer to avoid such conversions because they constitute a taxable event in their country. This isn’t applicable to the US, where crypto-to-crypto transactions are deemed taxable. But it applies, for example, to many countries in the EU, where taxes are only incurred when crypto is converted into fiat.
Only a price-stable cryptocurrency can fulfill these needs of cryptocurrency traders. Because cryptocurrency traders are naturally already enthusiastic about new protocols, this is also where we expect the initial demand for Basecoin to come from (i.e., the “early adopters”).
Credit and Debt Markets
Because of their volatility, today’s cryptocurrencies are unsuitable for even the most basic financial contracts that our economy relies on. Can you imagine taking a job that pays 1 Bitcoin a month, but still paying your monthly bills in USD—what would happen to you and your family if the price of BTC crashed? What about buying a house with a 30-year mortgage denominated in Bitcoin, but living in a world in which you’re probably still paid in dollars? These hypotheticals are unfathomable because credit and debt markets, and in fact markets for any financial contract over time, depend on price stability.
As a lender, when you structure a mortgage contract, the biggest risk that you take on is typically the risk of default. But if that mortgage were denominated in a volatile asset like Bitcoin, you’re also exposed to extreme price risk. For example, a 30-year home loan denominated in Bitcoin is suddenly worth very little if the price of Bitcoin dropped 90% any day in the next 30 years. To sign the deal, you must either be willing to speculate on the price of Bitcoin in every loan you make, or you must find a speculator who is. Either way, you end up charging the borrower a premium for you or a speculator’s willingness to hedge price risk. This adds substantial friction to the simplest of financial contracts.
By definition, this friction simply doesn’t exist in a price-stable currency. Price stability thus enables financial instruments to be cheaper, and makes markets more liquid. At a deeper level, to maintain their peg, price-stable currencies still require speculators who are willing to trade on expansions and contractions of the money supply. However, instead of operating on individual contracts, speculators operate on the currency itself, creating a pre-hedged, price-stable fungible asset that can be used to structure any deal as a derivative. This is like going from a world in which every home must have its own power generator, to a world in which a power plant leverages economies of scale and generates electricity for whole cities.
As cryptocurrency usage increases, we expect that demand will rise for a cryptocurrency usable for salaries, loans, futures contracts, options contracts, and more. In a price- volatile cryptocurrency, all contracts that involve payments through time require the friction of a speculator. Thus, by offering price stability, Basecoin is unique in enabling capital markets to form on top of its protocol. This is a source of demand that we expect will grow larger and larger as time goes on.
The Broader Blockchain Economy
A number of visionaries in the blockchain industry believe that we will soon see an ecosystem of “blockchain apps” arise, reimplementing existing services in a decentral- ized manner. For example, we may one day see a “blockchain Uber” or “blockchain Airbnb,” each with its own app token. In fact, this is already happening withFilecoin reimplementing the Internet’s storage layer. Seethis blog postfor a great description of what this broader blockchain economy might look like.
很多区块链行业的远见者们都相信，很快就会形成“区块链应用”生态系统，将现有服务以去中心化的方式重建。比如，某天我们可能会看到“区块链版Uber”或“区块链版 Airbnb”，且每个项目都有着自己应用的代币。实际上，这样的事情已经发生了- Filecoin 已经重建了互联网存储层。Coinbase的共同创立者、Basecoin的天使投资人和顾问Fred Ehrsam曾发表过很棒的博客文章10，描述了这种更为广泛的区块链经济。
Of course, if each blockchain app were to create its own token, there will need to be an interchange system to convert between some “universal token” and all of the different app tokens. We expect that everyone will hold this universal token and pay with it when using a blockchain app. Then, upon payment, the universal token will immediately get converted into the app token at the market rate. This would be similar to having your bank account in USD and using your debit card in a foreign country like Spain, in which case your bank converts your USD into EUR at the market rate every time you make a purchase, without you having to think about it.
If this ecosystem of blockchain apps arose, necessitating the need for a universal token, it would be very strange if that universal token were not price-stable. For example, imagine if your daily bus ride to work required $5 today and $50 tomorrow. Even more importantly, as we’ll elaborate on in the next section, a price-volatile coin is vulnerable to hoarding incentives. If people believe that a coin will appreciate in the future, they are incentivized not to spend their precious appreciating assets. This would kill the blockchain economy before it even got off the ground. In other words, if you believe in the future of blockchain apps, not only should you believe that a price-stable coin will be needed for interchange—you better hope that a price-stable coin will succeed.
Averting Macroeconomic Depressions
Imagine a world in which crypto has won over fiat. All savings are held in Bitcoin, and everything is priced and paid for in BTC—from groceries to gas, from new cars to new homes. What would happen if a Bitcoin lending service made a bunch of subprime loans that went bad, causing a repeat of the 2008 Great Recession?
Because there is no “Bitcoin Fed,” there is a real risk the recession would grow into a full-fledged macroeconomic depression. Many economists believe that the Fed’s actions in the 2008 crisis saved the world from another Great Depression. The logic behind this belief is actually fairly simple. Imagine we’re in a recession, and demand for goods is falling. People buying fewer goods generally means that prices will fall. But in the face of falling prices, why make that home renovation for 10 BTC now, when it might only cost 5 BTC in a year? And so demand falls further, causing prices to continue to fall, and so on into a self-fulfilling prophecy. This phenomenon is known as a deflationary spiral, and it has been known to cause extraordinary losses in economic productivity, as happened during the Great Depression.Keynesian economic theoryproposes that these destructive spirals can be broken by expansionary monetary policy that creates more money when price levels fall. However, this is impossible with existing cryptocurrencies because their money supply is fixed. On the other hand, this intelligent expansion of the money supply is exactly what the Fed did in 2008 to preventa repeat of the Great Depression, and it is also exactly what the Basecoin protocol has built-in.
因为并不存在“比特币联储”，所以经济衰退演变成一场全面宏观经济萧条的风险是真正存在的。许多经济学家都认为，美联储08年经济危机中的举动拯救了世界于另一场大萧条之中。这个信念背后的逻辑很简单。想象我们正处于经济衰退期，对商品的需 求正在下降，人们购买力的降低通常意味着价格下跌。但既然面对着下跌的价格，为什么要现在以10比特币的价格进行房屋装修，而不是等到明年该价值可能会下跌到5比特币时再进行呢?因此，需求会进一步下滑，导致价格进一步下跌，以此类推，周而复始，进入一个不断自我实现的预言循环。这种现象被称为“通缩螺旋”，而这种现象之所以为人所知，是因为08年经济危机期间，该现象曾导致生产力巨大损伤。凯恩斯主义经济学认为，这些极具破坏性的螺旋可以通过扩张性货币政策来打破，即在物价水平下跌期间创造更多货币。然而，这对现有的数字货币来说是不可能的，因为它们 的货币供应量都是固定的。另一方面，这种智能扩张的货币供应正是美联储在08年为防止经济大萧条重演时所做的，也正是我们Basecoin协议的内置内容。
Cryptocurrency technology is rapidly advancing to the point where it will better serve citizens of hyperinflating economies than their local currencies, where it will serve as a more convenient stable asset for cryptocurrency traders than cash, and where it will enable cryptocurrency capital markets and a full blockchain economy to form. In this future world, governments would do well to support cryptocurrencies that are stable in the face of macroeconomic upheaval. In fact, citizens may even demand it.
How Basecoin Implements Price Stability
Basecoin implements price stability using the same economic principles relied upon by central banks around the world. The most important of these is theQuantity Theory of Money. In this section, we discuss the following topics:
- How the Quantity Theory of Money ties long-run price levels to the supply and demand for
- How the Basecoin protocol estimates changes in demand by monitoring the exchange rate between Basecoin and its pegged
- How the Basecoin protocol expands and contracts Basecoin token supply based on the exchange
- How these protocol-enforced actions incentivize speculators to make markets on Basecoin’s exchange rate, maintaining Basecoin’s peg even in the short-run.
- 这些由协议强制执行的操作是如何激励投机者们以Basecoin作为交易媒介， 甚至短期内帮助维持Basecoin挂钩的。
The Quantity Theory of Money
History has shown that as markets rise and fall, people’s choices in an economy are vulnerable to frenzies and panics. During an economic boom, people have more money, so they want to buy more goods, causing the prices of goods to rise, which fuels demands for higher wages, which means people have even more money. This is an inflationary spiral, and it happened to Germany in the 1920s, Brazil in the 1980s, and Argentina in the 1990s. Similarly, in an economic bust, people are afraid to buy goods, causing the prices of goods to drop, driving people to put off purchases further until prices fall even more, and so on. This is known as a deflationary spiral—and it almost occurred during the global recession of 2008. In both of these situations, a responsible central bank can step in to cut off these destructive feedback loops. But how do central banks manage this task?
历史表明，随着市场起伏，人们在脆弱的经济中往往更容易做出疯狂和恐慌的决策。 在经济繁荣时期，人们经济条件充裕，购买力高，致使物价水平上升，也为涨工资的 需求提供了燃料，而这就意味着人们会有更多的钱。就是这样一个“通胀螺旋”，发生 在了二十世纪二十年代的德国，八十年代的巴西和九十年代的阿根廷。同理，在经济萧条时期，人们害怕买东西，导致物价水平下跌，然后人们进一步推迟购买，致使物价继续下跌等等。这就是所谓的“通缩螺旋”-08年经济危机中就险些发生这样的一 幕。在这两种情况下，任何负责任的央行都可以通过介入切断这些极具破坏性的反馈循环。但央行们又是如何介入的呢?
Imagine that prices in an economy are at some level—say, the average cost of a pre-defined “basket of goods” is $100. The Quantity Theory of Money says that if you doubled the amount of money that everyone had in their bank accounts, then, in the long run, that same basket of goods would cost $200. Why? While the nominal amount of money everyone has has doubled, the true value of goods has stayed the same. This means that people should be willing to part with twice as much nominal money to get the same amount of value. The same principle applies in the reverse: If we yanked half of peoples’ savings out of the economy, then in the long run, our same basket of goods would cost only $50.
想象在某经济体中已经具备着一定价格水平-比如，一个预定义的“一揽子商品”价格 为100美元。那么货币数量论则认为，如果将每人的银行存款乘以2，那么后续长期看来，同样的“一揽子商品”将价值200美元。为什么?尽管每个人的名义货币翻了一番， 但商品的实际价值却保持不变。这就意味着，人们应该愿意以先前两倍的货币购买同样价值的商品。这样的原则反之亦然:如果我们把人们的积蓄提出一半，那么长期看来，同样的“一揽子商品”就应仅价值50美元。
Extending this concept, we consider the case of a central bank trying to calm inflation. High prices that are constantly rising mean that people are too willing to spend money. To restore prices, we could restrict people to have less money. (Let’s put aside how for now.) Similarly, the opposite applies with deflation, which makes people unwilling to spend money. To restore prices, we could give people more money. This simple but important idea is exactly what central banks do to stabilize prices. While the tools that central banks use to implement monetary policy can be abstruse and difficult to understand, e.g.,open market operationsandreserve requirements, a central bank does precisely two things at a high level:
- Expand the money If a central bank sees that prices are going down, it can expand the money supply to bring them back up.
- Contract the money If a central bank sees that prices are going up, it can contract the money supply to bring them back down.
对此概念进行延伸，我们考虑了一个“央行试图平息通胀”的情况。高物价水平且仍在 持续增长，意味着人们“太愿意”花钱。为了恢复价格，我们可以对此加以限制，使他 们拥有更少的钱(至于如何做到这一点，我们暂且不谈)。同样的情况也适用于通缩- 人们不愿意花钱，我们就给他们更多的钱。这个简单而重要的想法正是央行为稳定价格所做的。虽然央行实施货币政策的工具可能是深奥而难以理解的，例如公开市场操作13和准备金要求14，但身居高位的央行的确能够精准地完成以下两件事:
- 收紧货币供应:如果央行发现物价水平持续升高，那么他们通过减少货币供 应把价格水平降下去。
Expanding and contracting the money supply works because the Quantity Theory of Money states that long-run prices in an economy are proportional to the total supply of money in circulation. Below is an example of the theory, applied to keep price levels stable in a currency like Basecoin:
- Suppose you want to peg a currency like Basecoin such that 1 token always trades for 1 USD. We’ll show that you can do this by growing or shrinking the supply of tokens in proportion with how far the current exchange rate is from the desired
- First, we introduce the concept of aggregate demand. Conceptually, aggregate demand describes how much people in aggregate want the coin: demand = (coin price) * (number of coins in circulation)
This is also known as a coin’s market cap, since market cap equivalently describes how much people in aggregate value the coin.
- Let X represent the number of coins in circulation, e., coin supply. Suppose
that demand has risen over the past few months such that coins are now trading for $1.10:
demand = $1.10 * X
- To determine how coin supply can be adjusted to restore the peg of $1, assume that demand stays constant, and let Y represent the desired number of coins in circulation:
demand_before = $1.10 * X demand_after = $1.00 * Y demand_before = demand_after
- Solving for Y implies that in order to get your coin to trade at $1, you need to
increase the supply of your coin by a factor of 1.1: Y = X * 1.1
- 如果用X表示流通中的代币量，即代币供应量。假设过去几个月的需求增长 使代币现价为1.10美元，那么:
需求量_之前 = $1.10 * X
需求量_之后 = $1.00 * Y
需求量_之前 = 需求量_之后
Y = X * 1.10
As a rough estimate, the Quantity Theory of Money finds that if Basecoin is trading at some price P that is too high or too low, the protocol can restore long-term prices to $1 by multiplying existing supply by P. There are some technical details that we’ll get to later about how fast the protocol must respond, how fast prices will respond, and so on—but the core idea is that to maintain a peg in the long term, we just need to measure the price of Basecoin and adjust coin supply accordingly.
还有一些技术细节我们会在后续章节中介绍，包括协议需要以多快的速度响应等等- 但核心思想是维持长久挂钩-只需测定Basecoin价格并对代币供应量做出相应调整即 可。
The Basecoin Protocol
We have found that Basecoin will maintain its peg in the long run if token supply is adjusted to match token price. How does the Basecoin protocol measure token price? How does it adjust supply?
We tackle these questions here by providing a full specification of the Basecoin protocol. At a high level, the protocol can be understood as having all the technical properties of a traditional cryptocurrency like Bitcoin, but with these additional features:
- The protocol defines a Peg. First, the protocol defines a pegged asset. This might be the USD, another fiat currency,an index like the Consumer Price Index (CPI), or a basket of goods—let’s use the USD as an example in the rest of this section. Then, the protocol defines a target price for Basecoin in the pegged asset—say, $1 for 1 Basecoin token.
- The blockchain monitors exchange rates to measure price.The blockchain sources a feed of the Basecoin-USD exchange rate via anoracle system. This can be done in a decentralized way,as we’ll detail later.
- The blockchain expands and contracts the supply of Basecoin tokens in response to deviations of the exchange rate from the peg.
- 由协议设定挂钩资产。首先，协议会定义一个挂钩资产。可以是美元、任何其他法币、指数(如居民消费价格指数)或任何“一揽子商品”-后续以美元为例。然后再由协议为Basecoin在其挂钩资产中定义出一个目标价格-比 如，1 Basecoin = $1 由区块链监测汇率并测定价格。
- 区块链会通过Oracle系统(Oracle System) 收录Basecoin/USD兑换率。这点可以通过去中心化的方式实现。
If Basecoin is trading for more than $1, the blockchain creates and dis- tributes new Basecoin. These Basecoin are given by protocol-determined priority to holders of Base Bonds and Base Shares, two separate classes of tokens that we’ll detail later.
如果Basecoin的交易价格高于$1.00，那么区块链就会创造并分发新的 Basecoin. 这些Basecoin会按照协议决定的次序，由债券币和股份币的持有者们发出。债券币和股份币是两种不同类别的代币，后续会详细解释。
If Basecoin is trading for less than $1, the blockchain creates and sells Base Bonds in an open auction to take coins out of circulation. Base Bonds cost less than 1 Basecoin, and they have the potential to be redeemed for exactly 1 Basecoin when Basecoin is created to expand supply. This incentivizes speculators to participate in bond sales and thereby destroy Basecoin in exchange for the potential that Base Bonds will pay out in the future.
如果Basecoin的交易价格低于$1.00，那么区块链就会创造并通过公开竞价的方式出售债券币，使其不再流通。债券币的购买单价低于Basecoin 代币，且每一枚债券币都有着“在Basecoin按需扩大供应时按1 Basecoin 价格出售”的潜力。这样的机制鼓励了投机者参与债券币的销售，也因此 有助于销毁交易所中的Basecoin，换取债券币未来的支付潜力。
The Basecoin protocol might be better understood by comparing it with the Fed. Like the Fed, the Basecoin blockchain monitors price levels and adjusts the money supply by executing open market operations, which in our case consists of creating Basecoin or Base Bonds. Like for the Fed, these operations are predicted by the Quantity Theory of Money to produce long-run price levels at the desired peg.If Basecoin is trading for less than $1, the blockchain creates and sells Base Bonds in an open auction to take coins out of circulation. Base Bonds cost less than 1 Basecoin, and they have the potential to be redeemed for exactly 1 Basecoin when Basecoin is created to expand supply. This incentivizes speculators to participate in bond sales and thereby destroy Basecoin in exchange for the potential that Base Bonds will pay out in the future.
We now fill in the details of the protocol below.
Measuring the Exchange Rate
First, we explain how the Basecoin blockchain obtains the Basecoin-USD exchange rate. Since this information is external to the blockchain, the Basecoin protocol must implement what is known as an oracle system, i.e., a system that uploads outside information to a blockchain. This can be implemented in several ways:
- Trusted feed. The simplest approach is to have a single feed that uploads the real-world exchange rate to the blockchain, say from Coinbase, Kraken, or another large exchange. This is obviously a point of centralization, but it bears mentioning nonetheless.
- 可信信息源:这种最简便的途径是由单一来源向区块链上传现存交易所(比 如Coinbase, Kraken或其他大型交易所)的实时货币兑换率。这显然是中心化 的一大要点，但却是值得一提的。
- Delegated decentralized feed. A semi-decentralized approach is to select asmall group of feed uploaders by vote from holders of Basecoin. Given this set of feed uploaders, the system can choose the median exchange rate from them at fixed intervals. If any bad actor is consistently identified as trying to corrupt the feed, they can be voted out of the system by coin-holders who have an incentive to preserve the system’s long-term value. This captures most of the benefits of decentralization. A similar scheme called Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) is even used in other protocols to generate entire blocks, though some argue that it’s gameable.
- 去中心化受托人信息源:这种半去中心化的途径是通过投票，从Basecoin代币持有者中选出几位，组成一个用来获取信息的受托人。有了这样的设定， 系统便能够按照固定区间取中值。若任何不当行为被持续识别为“企图腐蚀” 小组，那些有着保护系统长期价值动机的代币持有者们就会将其票出。这一途径成功捕捉了去中心化的大部分优势。受托人机制(DPoS机制)与之相似， 甚至已用于其他协议生成完整区块-尽管该算法是否存在作弊现象仍然备受争议。
- Decentralized Schelling point scheme. A fully decentralized approach is to use a Schelling point scheme to determine the exchange rate. A Schelling point scheme operates something like this:
- 去中心化谢林点（Schelling point）机制:谢林点概念是由美国诺贝尔奖获得者托马斯·谢林于1960年在《冲突的策略》一书中提出的。谢林描述“每个人期望的聚焦点是他人期望他本人期望被期望做出的选择。” 这个完全去中心化的途径是通过谢林点机制判定兑换率的。其运行过程大致如下:
- Anyone on the network can vote on what they think the average exchange rate was in the last 5 minutes.
- Every 5 minutes, the votes are aggregated and weighted by the number of coins possessed by each voter. In other words, the more coins you have, the more weight your vote gets.
- The weighted median is taken as the true exchange rate. Additionally, the weighted 25th and 75th percentiles of price estimates are computed.
- People who guessed between the 25th and 75th percentiles are rewarded with a preset amount of newly-created Basecoin. This reward encourages people to vote, and furthermore to vote with the consensus.
- Optionally, people who guessed outside the 25th or 75th percentiles can be penalized by having some of their stake slashed.
- 所有的投票结果每5分钟整合清算一次，并根据投票人持有的代币数量所 占比重进行计算。换句话说，你持有的代币越多，你的投票就越有份量;
By weighting according to coin ownership, selecting the median, and including a consensus reward mechanism, the scheme largely protects itself from bad actors so long as no actor owns more than 50% of the voting coinbase. It will be necessary to design the scheme’s reward and penalty rules so that enough people are incentivized to vote. Should these incentives be designed correctly, the result provides the same level of security as that offered by Bitcoin (which is similarly vulnerable if a single miner claims more than 50% of mining CPU), Ethereum (should it implement proof of stake), etc.Optionally, people who guessed outside the 25th or 75th percentiles can be penalized by having some of their stake slashed.
The trusted feed and delegated decentralized feed approaches are easy ways to securely bootstrap the protocol, with some sacrifices to decentralization. The Schelling point scheme is more novel, but we believe we can make it robust by properly engineering its incentives. Either way, all of these implementations are valid alternatives for providing the Basecoin blockchain with a feed of Basecoin-USD prices.
As an aside, sourcing a Basecoin-USD exchange rate need not depend on liquid currency markets between Basecoin and USD. In fact, the exchange rate can be computed by measuring any prices denominated in Basecoin. For example, if Basecoin has trouble getting listed on a crypto-fiat exchange, the Basecoin-USD rate can be sourced from a crypto-only exchange by first obtaining the Basecoin-Bitcoin rate, and then separately sourcing the Bitcoin-USD rate. We could even get creative by setting up a Basecoin-denominated marketplace, observing the Basecoin price of items with known USD prices, and computing an implied Basecoin-USD rate. While we expect to be able to rapidly integrate with exchanges since we have several angels with large stakes in prominent crypto-fiat exchanges (including a member of the Kraken board), we note that the protocol does not depend on this in order to source a robust exchange rate.
另外，Basecoin/USD兑换率并不取源于Basecoin和USD间的流动货币市场。事实上，兑换率可以通过任何以Basecoin衡量价格的货币来计算。举个例子，如果Basecoin在代 币-法币交易所上市时遇到麻烦，那么Basecoin/USD的数据源就可以通过提前获取币 币交易所中Basecoin/Bitcoin汇率，再单独收录Bitcoin/USD汇率来实现。我们甚至可以更具创意地创建一个以Basecoin标价的市场，观察已知美元价格的商品的Basecoin价格变化，并借此估算出Basecoin/USD汇率。虽然我们也希望能够尽快融入交易所-因为我们在全球几大杰出代币-法币交易所中 有着几位天使投资人(包括Coinbase联合创始人，Kraken董事会成员之一的Fred Ehrsam)且占有很大股份，但我们却注意到，Basecoin协议若想获得强健汇率，并不能依赖于此。
Expansion and Contraction via a Three-Token System
To expand and contract the supply of Basecoin, the Basecoin protocol defines three classes of tokens. We briefly mentioned these three classes earlier. Here, we define them explicitly:
- Basecoin. Called coins for short, these are the core tokens of the system. They are pegged to the USD and are intended to be used as a medium of exchange. Their supply is expanded and contracted in order to maintain the peg.
- Basecoin: 暂称为代币，这些是系统的核心代币。它们挂钩美元并试图作为交 易所的价格基准。其价格的伸缩旨在维持与美元的挂钩。
- Base Bonds. Called bonds for short, these tokens are auctioned off by the blockchain when it needs to contract Basecoin Bonds are not pegged to anything, and each bond promises the holder exactly 1 Basecoin at some point in the future under certain conditions. Since newly-issued bonds are sold on open auction for prices of less than 1 Basecoin, you can expect to earn a competitive premium or “yield” for your bond purchase. The conditions under which a bond is redeemed are:
- BaseBonds:暂称为债券币，这类代币会在Basecoin需要收缩供给时被区块链拍卖掉。债券币自身并不挂钩任何货币，每一枚债券币都可以在未来的某些情况下抵作1枚Basecoin。由于新发行的债券币在开放拍卖时售价低于1 Basecoin，因此您大可期望认购的债券币能够带来极具竞争力的溢价和”收益”。那么赎回债券币的条件是:
1、The blockchain is creating and distributing Basecoin, i.e., it has determined that an expansion of the Basecoin supply is necessary.
2、This bond has not expired, i.e., it has been fewer than 5 years since the bond was issued.
3、All Base Bonds that were issued before this bond have been redeemed or expired.
- BaseShares：Called shares for short, these are tokens whose supply is fixed at the genesis of the blockchain. They are not pegged to anything, and their value stems from their dividend policy. When demand for Basecoin goes up and the blockchain creates new Basecoin to match demand, shareholders receive these newly-created Basecoins pro rata so long as all outstanding Base Bonds have been redeemed.
- BaseShares: 暂称为股份币，这些是在区块链起源时定量供应的代币。股份币 本身并不挂钩任何货币，它们的价值源于它们的分红政策。当Basecoin的市场需求上升，区块链创建了新的Basecoin以匹配需求时，只要所有未偿还的债券币已被赎回，股东们就可以按比例获得这些新创Basecoin。
Expansion works as follows. First, the blockchain tallies any outstanding Base Bonds and orders them according to when they were issued, with the oldest first. We call this ordered sequence of bonds the Bond Queue. The blockchain also tallies all outstanding Base Shares. Then, the blockchain creates N new Basecoin tokens and distributes them as follows:
- Bondholders are paid first, and in first-in-first-out (FIFO) If there are any outstanding Base Bonds, the blockchain begins converting bonds into coins, one-for-one, according to their order in the Bond Queue. For example, if we need to create 100 Basecoin, we convert the 100 oldest outstanding bonds into 100 new coins. The FIFO queue incentivizes people to buy bonds sooner than later, since bonds bought sooner are paid out before bonds bought later.
- 债券币持有者最先支付，遵循先入先出(FIFO)顺序原则:如果有未偿还的债 券币，则区块链会按照债券币序列中的顺序将其1:1转换成代币。举个例子， 我们需要创建100枚Basecoin, 那么就会将最久一批未偿还的债券币转换成100 枚新代币。也就是说，这种先入先出序列鼓励了人们-越早参与奖励越多， 因为早期购买的债券币会在下一批债券币发行前赎回。
- Shareholders are paid after If there are no more outstanding Base Bonds, the system issues any remaining new coins to shareholders, pro rata, as a dividend. For example, if we need to create 1 million Basecoin, and there are 0 outstanding bonds and 10 million outstanding shares, then each share receives 0.1 Basecoin.
- 股份币持有者在债券币持有者之后支付:若债权币已全部清算完毕，系统会 将剩余的新代币按比例分配给股份币持有者。举个例子，我们需要创建100万 枚Basecoin，在剩余未赎回的债券币为0的情况下，有1000万枚股份币已经发 行，那么每个股份币就都会收到0.1枚Basecoin.
To prevent a situation in which the Bond Queue grows so long that spec- ulators no longer value new bonds at the end of the queue, we also give bonds an expiration. The longer the Bond Queue grows, the longer it takes for new bonds at the end of the queue to get paid out. This causes the price of new bonds to drop since speculators start demanding a higher return for the extra time and risk that they take on. But if the price of new bonds drops to 0, the system cannot contract supply anymore—a price of 0 means that nobody wants to exchange their Basecoin for Base Bonds. To prevent this from happening, we forcibly “expire” all bonds that have been in the Bond Queue for more than 5 years, even if they have yet to be redeemed. We selected a 5-year bond expiration after rigorous simulation showed that this produced a robust system with sufficiently high bond prices even in the face of wild price swings. We save the details for later discussion.
为防止因债券币序列排队过长而导致的后位投机者对新债券币的不再重视，我们给债 券币加上了有效日期。债券币序列赠长的时间越长，排在序列后面的债券币等待支付 的时间就越久。而这将导致新债券币的价格下跌-因为投机者们会开始因为多付出的 时间和风险要求更高的回报。但如果新债券币的价格降到0，那么系统就不能再继续缩 紧供应了-价格为0意味着没有人还会愿意用Basecoin兑换债券币。为防止这种情况的 发生，即使尚未赎回，我们也会强行赋予所有排在序列中的债券币一个5年的“有效 期”。该有效期的界定经过了严格模拟，确保了即使是在价格疯狂波动的情况下，5年 为期也足以形成一个强健的系统，债券币的价格也会足够高。对此我们保留细节以便后续讨论。
Is there a cost to having an expiration? Certainly. Leaving bonds permanently unpaid after an expiration makes bonds generally riskier, which pushes overall bond prices down. But the key insight is that expiring bonds greatly increases bond prices during critical, hypothetical scenarios where system demand has been contracting for an extended period of time. For example, if Basecoin demand dropped sharply one year,and it didn’t recover enough over the next 5 years to pay for all the Base Bonds issued in that first year, those early Base Bonds will simply expire. These expirations shorten the Bond Queue, helping buttress new bond prices to be higher than they would have been otherwise. Stepping back, we can see that an expiration strikes a tradeoff that penalizes calmer times in favor of critical times, which increases system stability.
设定有效期有没有成本呢?当然。拖欠债券币直至其永久过期不仅会使债券币承受更 大的风险，还会拖低债券币的整体价格。但关键洞悉是，即将到期的债券币会在系统需求长期收缩的情况下(一种非常要命的假设情景)大幅抬高债券币价格。例如，如 果Basecoin的需求在一年内急速下降，且未来5年内都不足以弥补第一年发行的债券币 总量，那么这些早期的债券币就会过期。然后缩短债券币序列，并帮助新发行的债券 币不断达到价格新高。退一步讲，有效期能够打击“惩罚平静时代，赞同关键时刻”的 投机交易，而这的确有助于提高系统稳定性。
Conceptually, the Bond Queue is similar to the US national debt. Just like how the Basecoin system issues Base Bonds that go into the Bond Queue until they are paid, the government issues Treasury bonds that add to the national debt until they are paid. When the national debt grows too large, faith in Treasury bonds drops, resulting in higher borrowing costs against the future that eventually manifest as future inflation, higher future taxes, or future default. By capping the size of the Bond Queue and automatically defaulting on bonds that are too old, Basecoin disallows this tax on future stability. Instead, its fixed bond expiration transparently taxes the present. An expiration, in other words, strikes a transparent balance between higher borrowing costs now (in the form of lower bond prices when the Bond Queue is short), and lower borrowing costs when we really need it (in the form of higher bond prices when the Bond Queue would otherwise be too long).
从概念上讲，债券币序列类似于美国国债。就像美国政府将发行国库券并列入国债直 至付清那样，Basecoin系统发行债券币，加入债券币序列，然后等待支付。当国债过多 时，人们对国库券的信心下降导致未来借贷成本上升，最终将表现为未来通胀、未来 较高税收或未来违约。通过限制债券币序列长度和自动清算过旧债券币，Basecoin并不允许其未来稳定性负以如此“重担”。相反，其定量发行的、具备有效期的债券币很通 透地为其未来稳定缴了税。换句话说，这打击了现在较高的借贷成本(表现为在债券币序列较短时单价过高)和在我们真正需要时的较低借贷成本(表现为债券币价格低- 否则债券币序列会过长)间一种通透平衡。
In summary, the expansion mechanism can also be understood through the following example:
- Suppose there are 500 bonds in the Bond Queue, 200 of which were issued more than 5 years Additionally, suppose there are 1,000 shares in circulation.
- Suppose the system needs to create 1,000 new
- The system expires the 200 oldest bonds, leaving 300 bonds in the queue. If the system needed to create fewer than 300 coins, it would only redeem the oldest bonds. However, the system needs to create 1,000 coins, so it redeems all 300 bonds.
- The system still needs to create 700 more The system distributes these 700 coins evenly across the 1,000 shares. Each share receives 700 / 1,000 = 0.7 coins. If you hold 100 shares for example, you would receive 70 coins during this expansion, which you can then sell for USD.
假设系统需要创造1,000枚新代币。 系统自动失效了这200枚旧债券币，剩下300枚债券币留在序列之中。如果系 统需要的新创代币数量少于300，那么赎回这些旧债券币就够了。然而，系统 需要新创1,000枚代币，所以还是先赎回了这300枚旧债券币。 系统还需要创建700枚代币。所以系统将这700枚代币平均分配给这1,000枚股 份币。所以每一枚股份币都将收到700/1,000 = 0.7枚代币。如果你持有100枚 股份币，那么这次扩张你将能收到70枚可以马上转出的代币。
Contraction works as follows. In order to destroy Basecoin, we must properly incen- tivize holders of Basecoin to lock up their Basecoin in exchange for future payoff. We do this by having the blockchain issue and sell Base Bonds. As discussed earlier, Base Bonds are sold on open auction for prices that are generally less than 1 Basecoin. In return, they promise a future payout of 1 Basecoin when the system is expanding and when there are no older outstanding bonds, so long as the bond has not expired due to it having not been redeemed for 5 years.
供应紧缩是这样进行的:为了销毁Basecoin, 我们必须适当鼓励代币持有者们将其 Basecoin“锁定”于交易所，以期未来回报。这一点我们可以通过区块链发行和债券币出 售来实现。正如前文所述，债券币是以公开拍卖出售的，价格往往低于1 Basecoin。作 为回报，在系统扩张且所有旧债券币都已被赎回的情况下，我们对债券币有着“未来可 以抵付1 Basecoin”的承诺，只要该债券币还未被赎回并仍处于5年的有效期内。
First, we discuss the open auction system. In order to sell bonds, the blockchain runs a continuous auction in which bidders specify a bid and bid size for new Base Bonds. In other words, auction participants specify how much Basecoin they want to pay for each bond and how many Base Bonds they want to buy at that price. For example, one can specify that they would like to purchase 100 bonds for 0.9 Basecoin per bond. When the blockchain decides to contract coin supply, it chooses the orders with the highest bids and converts the holders’ coins into bonds until sufficient Basecoin has been destroyed. As an example:
首先，我们来解释一下这个公开拍卖系统。为了出售债券币，区块链中运行着一种连 续拍卖机制-竞价者可自己拟定新债券币的竞价价格和竞拍数量。换句话说，拍卖参 与者们可以自己拟定想要为每个债券币支付多少枚Basecoin，以及他们想以这个价格竞 拍多少枚债券币。举个例子，某人希望以0.9 Basecoin的价格购买100枚债券币。当区块 链决定收缩代币供应时，它就会选择出价最高的订单，并将持有者的代币转换为债券 币，直到销毁了足够多的Basecoin. 如下:
- Suppose the system needs to take 100 coins out
- Suppose that there are two buy orders on the order book: One bid for 100 bonds at 8 Basecoin each, and one bid for 100 bonds at 0.4 Basecoin each.
- 假设订单列表中有两单:1. 以0.8 Basecoin/枚的价格收购100枚债券币;2. 以0.4 Basecoin/枚的价格收购100枚债券币;
- The system will fill the first order, giving the user 100 bonds in exchange for 100 * 8 = 80 coins. It will then partially fill the second order, giving the user 50 bonds in exchange for 50 * .4 = 20 coins. In total, 100 coins have been destroyed.
系统将自动完成订单1，给予订单1用户价值1000.8 = 80 Basecoin的100枚债 券币。然后完成部分订单2，即给予用户价值504 = 20 Basecoin的50枚债券 币。总计100枚Basecoin代币被销毁。
The protocol sets an artificial floor for the price of Base Bonds in order to ensure that it doesn’t borrow too heavily against the future in order to contract supply now. We currently set this floor at 0.10 Basecoin per bond. We have simulated bond prices to show that, under a very wide range of models of Basecoin demand, this floor is essentially never hit. We save further discussion fora subsequent section.
协议为债券币的价格设定了一个人工底线，以确保不会由于过度借贷抵御其未来交易。 我们目前将这个底线设置为0.1 Basecoin。就我们模拟出的债券币价格波动来看，该兑换率已完全能够满足Basecoin需求模型的广泛需要。后续会发布专门内容详细介绍。
A Few Technical Notes
We have now specified the core of the Basecoin protocol, which explains how the blockchain expands and contracts the supply of Basecoin to maintain its peg. Here, we address the most common question we hear: Does it work?
In particular, we address the following concerns:
- Robustness: Is the blockchain always able to contract supply when it needs to by selling Base Bonds?
- Price responsiveness: The Quantity Theory of Money operates on the long term. When the blockchain takes an action to expand or contract supply, does the exchange rate respond quickly enough?
- 价格响应:货币数量论是长期作用的。当区块链对扩张或收缩代币供应量采取 行动时，汇率的响应速度是否足够快?
Another way of asking the first question is: Under what scenarios will the price of new Base Bonds hit the artificial floor? To answer this question, we constructed multiple different models for bond price and multiple different models for Basecoin demand as measured by market cap. Then, we ran Monte Carlo simulations with different parameterizations of these models to estimate the probability of bond price hitting the artificial floor under a wide variety of assumptions.
To provide some concreteness, our approaches to modeling market cap included the following:
- Modeling coin market cap as a geometric brownian motion(GBM), a model commonly used in equity option pricing We fit GBM parameters for drift and sigma on the historical returns of a variety of assets and indices like Bitcoin, Ethereum, the S&P 500, US 10-Year Treasuries, and the US GDP. We also simulated market caps on a dense grid of (drift, sigma) values to determine how robustness varies with these core input parameters.
- 将代币市值建模为几何布朗运动(GBM)，这是股票期权定价理论中常用的模型。我们用以下资产和指数的历史回报来确定GBM中的漂移系数(μ)和Sigma系 数(σ):比特币、以太坊、标准普尔500指数，美国10年期国债和美国GDP 等。我们也用μ和σ来模拟了市值，来确定这些核心参数是不是健壮。
- Modeling coin market cap using block bootstrapping, a method for sampling dependent test statistics from non-stationary time series data. We sampled from the returns of the same assets and indices mentioned above.
- 使用分块自助法(block bootstrapping)对虚拟币市值进行建模，这是一种从非平稳时间序列数据中抽取相关测试统计数据的方法。我们从上面提到的相同资产和指数的历史回报中抽样。
With regard to bond pricing, our approaches involved the following:
- Using risk-neutral pricing, another hallmark of option pricing theory, in which we assumed a replicating portfolio to determine bond price under a GBM
- Using a time-tested Sharpe Ratio pricing method to determine a bond price that does not rely on GBM
While the details are beyond the scope of this whitepaper, a thorough robustness analysis paper will be posted to our website in the coming days.
- 使用风险中性定价-期权定价理论的另一个标志。其中我们通过假设一个复制 的资产组合来确定GBM模型下的债券币价格。
- 使用经过时间检验的夏普比率定价方法(Sharpe Ratio pricing method)来确定那 些不依赖于GBM假设的债券币价格。
One might be concerned that the Basecoin protocol doesn’t react to price drops or price increases in real time. In particular, the protocol quantizes its actions into time steps, suggesting that if there is a shock to the system, the price might be very low or very high for a prolonged period of time before the protocol responds. Furthermore, even once the protocol responds, the Quantity Theory of Money is only defined on long-run prices. How can we be assured that exchange rates will quickly be brought back to the peg?
有人可能会担心Basecoin协议是否能够即时响应价格变化。尤为特别的是，该协议将响 应的处理量化到时间段，而这意味着一旦系统受到冲击，价格就会在协议做出响应之 前变得异常低或异常高。此外，即使协议立即作出响应，货币数量论这一内置货币政 策也只针对于长期价格。那我们如何能够确保汇率迅速回至挂钩水平呢?
The critical insight is that all incentives in the system are structured to encourage exchange rate traders to restore a peg, so long as they expect a long-term correction of coin prices. How does this work concretely? For example, if a speculator sees that the price is too low and he believes it’s eventually going to correct because of a reaction from the protocol, he is incentivized to buy coins in anticipation of the protocol’s actions to capitalize on the current, temporary drop in prices. As a result, prices rise back to the peg, even in advance of any reaction from the protocol. Similarly, if a speculator sees that the price of the coin is too high above the peg, then he might take a short position, which puts downward, peg-restoring pressure on the price.
Speculators taking long and short positions like this can be thought of as liquidity providers that buffer spikes in Basecoin demand. This buffer applies both before the protocol has a chance to respond, and after it responds but far earlier than one would otherwise expect the long-run price predictions of the Quantity Theory of Money to take effect. Thus, so long as there is sufficient liquidity, and so long as these liquidity providers trust the protocol to restore Basecoin supply to the appropriate amount before this liquidity is used up, we should expect only small deviations in coin price around any peg.
投机者们采取做多和做空策略也可以被理解为，为Basecoin的需求高峰提供了流动资金。而该缓冲区在协议做出响应之前，和协做出响应之后(在货币数量论预测的长期 价格生效之前)都是适用的。因此，只要有足够的流动资产，且这些流动资产的提供 者相信，Basecoin协议能在流动资金耗尽之前将代币供给恢复到挂钩水平，那么我们就 应该期望无论代币价格与何种资产或指数挂钩，出现的偏差都将是极小的。
A Post-USD World
By pegging to a local currency, a cryptocurrency piggybacks on all the hard work that a central bank does to stabilize its currency’s purchasing power. In other words, Basecoin’s peg to the USD lets it effectively copy the Fed’s work of stabilizing the USD. But what happens if Basecoin gains popularity over time, acquiring users, to the point that it is as popular as credit cards, cash, and the dollar itself?
通过与当地货币挂钩，加密货币肩负着一切央行为稳定货币购买力所做的努力。换句话说，Basecoin与美元的挂钩使其高效地模仿了美联储稳定美元的操作。但如果 Basecoin随着时间推移受到越来越多用户的青睐，变得和信用卡、现金或美元本身一样 受欢迎时，又会如何呢?
One day, Basecoin might become so widely used as a medium of exchange that it actually starts to displace the USD in transaction volume. Were this to happen, Basecoin would present the world with both the technology and the opportunity to develop an independent, transparent, and potentially more stable monetary policy than anything that’s ever been possible via central bank. What does this mean for the future?
总有一天，Basecoin可能会被广泛用作交易媒介，甚至真正开始在交易量上取代美元。 如果这种情况真的发生，那么Basecoin将向世界展现其技术和机遇-发展一个独立、透 明且具有比任何央行货币政策都稳定而更具潜力的货币政策。这对未来意味着什么?
Pegging to the CPI
If Basecoin begins to command a significant share of the world’s transaction volume, we can assume that some goods will begin to be sold at prices denominated first in Basecoin. In such a world, the Basecoin protocol could be updated to a peg that is independent of any local currency—most probably, Basecoin could peg to the Basecoin-denominated prices of a basket of goods. This would be similar to how the Fed currently pegs to the consumer price index (CPI) to maintain the purchasing power stability of the dollar. If developers find that built-in inflation is beneficial to the economy or the system, the new peg could even incorporate a 2% inflation target, just like the Fed does.
如果Basecoin开始在全球交易量中占据大量份额，那么我们可以假设一些商品首先以 Basecoin定价销售。在这样的世界里，Basecoin协议就可以将挂钩更新至独立于任何当地的货币的资产或指数—最大可能便是与以Basecoin计价的“一揽子商品”挂钩。这与美 联储目前挂钩CPI以维持美元购买力稳定的举措类似。如果开发者发现其内置通胀对经 济或系统有利，那么新的挂钩甚至可以将高达2%的通胀目标纳入考虑范围，就像美联储那样。
We envision a number of potential benefits in this scheme. First, unlike the Fed, Basecoin will implement its monetary policy using a transparent, decentralized algorithm, with no direct human input. We acknowledge that a fully automated monetary policy has its dangers. However, we believe that because the Basecoin protocol presents, for the first time, the technology for a verifiable, fully automated monetary policy, we will see research in algorithmic monetary policy advance in lockstep as Basecoin usage grows.
我们预想到了这种机制的一系列潜在优势。首先，与美联储不同的是，Basecoin是通过 一种透明的去中心化算法来实施货币政策的，并无直接人力投入。我们承认全面自动 化的货币政策存在着危险。但我们也相信，由于Basecoin是首个可验证的全自动化货币政策技术的协议，因此随着使用量的增长，我们定将会看到这一算法货币政策的研究进展。
Additionally, a Basecoin protocol pegged to the CPI implements a monetary policy that is independent of any government. At a high level, we believe that governments provide two critical services to their citizens in maintaining control over the money supply: Verifiability and price stability. In terms of verifiability, a central government helps protect the users of a currency against counterfeiting. In terms of price stability, a central bank helps smooth macroeconomic demand and, in some cases, manage unemployment—this is the Fed’s so-called dual mandate. With the advent of Bitcoin and its solution to the double-spend problem, the need for centralized verifiability has disappeared. For the first time, Basecoin also eliminates the need for centralized price stability. However well-intentioned and well-insulated a central bank may be, governments with integrated central banks will always have the incentive to print money to escape fiscal debts. We imagine that should citizens choose this technology over local currency alternatives, an independent, transparent, cryptocurrency-based monetary policy could offer society a level of accountability like never before seen in history.
此外，挂钩CPI的Basecoin协议所执行的货币政策是独立于任何政府的。从更高层面上 看，我们相信政府会为其公民提供两项关键服务，以维持对货币供应的控制:可验证 性和价格稳定性。在可验证性方面，政府帮助保护公民免受伪造货币的侵害;在价格 稳定性方面，央行帮助平稳宏观经济需求，并在某些情况下管理失业问题——这是美 联储所谓的“双重使命”。随着比特币的出现和其为“双重支出”问题提供的解决方案的 问世，对中心化可验证性的需求已经消失。而Basecoin也首次消除了对中心化的价格稳 定的需求。然而，或许是出于好意和对“绝对保障”的考虑，那些拥有一体化央行的政 府总是有着动机以印钞逃避财政债务。我们设想着，一旦公民应该选择了Basecoin技术而非当地货币，那么一个独立、透明、基于加密资产的货币政策将会为社会提供历史上前所未有的责任。
As a final aside: If Basecoin were to transition to a CPI peg, a critic might argue that it would only fulfill one of the two current mandates of the Fed. In particular, it would stabilize prices but ignore unemployment. But this shortcoming is actually addressable. Think about what it means for the Fed to stabilize employment levels. Thinking a bit creatively, it is actually analogous to stabilizing the hourly price of labor. To see this, consider that during an economic shock, companies’ demand for labor declines, causing the price of a worker’s labor to drop as well. This brings about unemployment. To mitigate this, the Fed prints money and gives it to the economy, expecting that the economy will use that money to hire back human labor and push its price back up. But the Basecoin protocol can create coins in response to unemployment just as well as the Fed does—Basecoin can simply incorporate the price of labor into the exchange rate uploaded to its blockchain. Specifically, in the basket of goods used to compute CPI, the Basecoin protocol would simply include the price of one hour of a worker’s labor averaged across the entire economy. With this slight modification, we believe that Basecoin could replicate the Fed’s dual mandate while maintaining full, transparent, protocol-enforced decentralization.
最后一点:如果Basecoin转为与CPI挂钩，那么批评者们很有可能会说“它只能满足美联储当前的两项使命之一”。再具体一些，它能实现价格稳定，但却会忽略失业问题。但 这个缺点实际上是可以解决的-想想美联储是如何稳定就业水平的?更具创造性地思 考一下，这实际上类似于稳定劳动力的小时价格。设想，在经济动荡期间，企业对劳 动力的需求下降导致了工人劳动力价格下降，最终导致了失业问题。为缓解这一状况， 美联储以增加印钞援助经济，并期望经济能够通过这币资金重新雇回人力，将劳动力 价格推回高处。但Basecoin协议可以像美联储一样，创造出应对失业问题的代币- Basecoin可以简单地将劳动力价格纳入汇率并上传至区块链。再具体一点，在用于计算 CPI的“一揽子商品中”，Basecoin协议将简单地将整个经济体中工人的平均单位劳动时 间价格列入其中。通过这一细微修正，我们相信Basecoin能够在复制美联储“双重使命” 的同时，保持完整、透明和协议执行的去中心化优势。
A Regional Basecoin for Each Regional Economy
While it might seem attractive to have a single global currency, the reality is that it’s actually favorable for each regional economy to have its own currency that can respond independently to local demand shocks. This is because demand shocks can concentrate in a particular region, almost in complete isolation from the rest of the world. For example, this exact situation has recently been causing problems for the Eurozone—Greece could see a massive drop in domestic demand that isn’t shared by Germany. If they’re using a single currency when this happens, they are no better off than if they were each using their own fixed-supply currencies. For this reason, in the long run, it may be favorable to create a separate instance of Basecoin for each regional economy, with each pegging to a CPI computed for that particular region. This would make the world’s currency market similar to what we have today, only with each economy benefiting from the accountability and transparency of a codified monetary policy.
拥有单一全球货币看起来似乎很有吸引力，但现实情况却是每个区域经济体都有着各 自的货币，能够独立应对当地的需求冲击。这是因为，需求冲击很可能集中在几乎完 全与世隔绝的特定地区。例如，就是这种情况，最近已经给欧元区带来了问题—希腊 所经历的国内需求大幅下降对德国并不共享。如果他们在这种情况下使用单一货币， 那么与分别使用本国定量发行的货币相比，他们的状况并不会更好。因此，从长远来 看，为每个区域经济单独创建一个与该地区CPI挂钩的Basecoin或许才是更加有利的。 而这样做将使世界货币市场类似于当前，只是每个经济体都能从Basecoin这一数字化货 币政策的问责制和透明性质中受益。
Imagine a world in which Bitcoin starts competing with the USD in transaction usage. You would get paid in Bitcoin but pay rent in USD, or perhaps vice versa. This just doesn’t make sense given Bitcoin’s inherent volatility.
In this paper, we introduced Basecoin, a robust, decentralized implementation of a price-stable cryptocurrency. We believe that if we can just make it so that purchasing power doesn’t fluctuate, people will shift from a mindset in which they hold as little cryptocurrency as possible, to a mindset in which they are comfortable holding their savings or revenue in it. We believe this contribution will trigger cryptocurrencies to undergo a virtuous cycle of adoption and help them transition into a mainstream medium of exchange—a result that has eluded every other cryptocurrency thus far.
If you have any thoughts or want to be involved in the project, feel free to email the authors as shown on the title page. For the most up-to-date version of this whitepaper, please visitwww.getbasecoin.com.
作者：Basecoin白皮书 by Nader Al-Naji, Josh Chen, Lawrence Diao